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Two Paradigms for the Rule of International Trade Law
Jonathan T. Fried*
I.

WHAT

Is AT ISSUE?

A n international consensus has yet to emerge on a definition of "Sov-

ereignty" as a term of art under international law that befits modern economic realities. Consider the 8-7 split decision in the Advisory
Opinion on the Austria-German Customs Union case' by the Permanent Court of International Justice. It had been asked to consider
whether a proposed customs union between the two countries was compatible with Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain (1919),2 which
imposed a duty on Austria not to "alienate" its "independence" without the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, and with Protocol No. 1 of 1922, in which Austria undertook to abstain from any
economic or financial engagements calculated directly or indirectly to
compromise its independence. The eight judges in the majority stated:
[I]rrespective of the definition of the independence of States which
may be given by legal doctrine or may be adopted in particular instances in the practice of States, the independence of Austria, according to Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, must be understood
to mean the continued existence of Austria within her present frontiers as a separate State with sole right of decision in all matters economic, political, financial or other with the result that that independence is violated, as soon as there is any violation thereof, either in
the economic, political, or any other field, these different aspects of
independence being in practice one and indivisible...
One working hypothesis, provided to us by the majority opinion, is
that sovereignty exists where a government has the sole right of decision.3 Another view was offered by the minority. The seven dissenting
* Principal Counsel, Trade Law Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Government of Canada. Mr. Fried's remarks are offered in his personal capacity, and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Canada. He is indebted to Ton Zuijdwijk,
Senior Counsel, Trade Law Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, for
his comments on earlier drafts and his continued guidance on matters of European Community
law. Any errors or omissions of course remain the responsibility of the author.
1 Customs Regime Between Germany and Austria, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41.
The Treaty of Saint-Germain, art. 88, U.K.T.S. 11 (1919).
Judge Anzilotti, in a Separate Opinion, noted that:
[T]he independence of Austria within the meaning of Article 88 is nothing else but the
existence of Austria, within the frontiers laid down by the Treaty of Saint-Germain, as a
separate State and not subject to the authority of any other State or group of States. Inde-
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judges observed:
A State would not be independent in the legal sense if it was placed in
a condition of dependence on another Power, if it ceased itself to exercise within its own territory the summa potestas or sovereignty, i.e., if
it lost the right to exercise its own judgment in coming to the decisions which the government of its territory entails.
Restrictions on its liberty of action which a State may agree to do not
affect its independence, provided that the State does not thereby deprive itself of its organic powers. Still less do the restrictions imposed
by international law deprive it of its independence.
The difference between the alienation of a nation's independence and
a restriction which a State may agree to on the exercise of its sovereign power, i.e., of its independence, is clear. This latter is, for instance, the position of States which become Members of the League
of Nations. It is certain that membership imposes upon them important restrictions on the exercise of their independence, without its being possible to allege that it entails an alienation of that
independence.
Practically, every treaty entered into between independent States restricts to some extent the exercise of the power incidental to sovereignty. Complete and absolute sovereignty by any obligations imposed
by treaties is impossible and practically unknown.
The "alienation" of the independence of a State implies that the right
to exercise these sovereign powers would pass to another State or
group of States...
On this view, sovereignty exists where a government has autonomy: the right and ability to exercise its own judgment, including to
accept restrictions on freedom of action, if the acceptance is freely
given.
Both majority and minority views agree, however, that at a certain
point "sovereign" authority is transferred. The European Union is often
cited as an example of governments having freely chosen to restrict
their freedom of action to the extent that sovereignty has been transferred or surrendered. In the seminal case of Costa v. Enel,4 a dispute
involving a $3.00 electricity bill, the European Court of Justice stated:
Unlike ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty established its
pendence as thus understood is really no more than the normal condition of States according
to international law; it may also be described as sovereignty (suprema potestas), or external
sovereignty, by which is meant that the State has over it no other authority than that of

international law.

" Case

6/64 Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).
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own legal order, which was incorporated into the legal systems of the
Member States at the time the Treaty came into force and to which
the courts of the Member States are bound. In fact, by establishing a
Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, personality and legal capacity, the ability to be represented on the international level and, particularly, real powers resulting from a limitation
of the jurisdiction of the States or from a transfer of their powers to
the Community, the States relinquished, albeit in limited areas, their
sovereign rights and thus created a body of law applicable to their
nationals and to themselves.
In the 1974 Internationale Handelsgesellsehaft case, 5 the German
Constitutional Court was faced with a question regarding the compatibility of an EC rule with Article 24 of the Constitution, which authorizes the government by legislation to "transfer sovereign powers to interstate institutions." In its judgment, the court stated that "Article
24. . .opens up the national legal system (within the limits [of maintaining the institutions of government]) in such a way that the Federal
Republic of Germany's exclusive claim to rule is taken back in the
sphere of validity of the Constitution and room is given, within the
State's sphere of rule, to the direct effect and applicability of law from
another source."
Admittedly, in today's world, "sole source" decision-making is impossible as a matter of global economic realities. To take an obvious
example, no country acting alone can decide interest rates. And governments continue to freely enter into binding treaty commitments to restrict their freedom of action in their own self-interest.
The question is not whether "sovereignty" has been compromised,
or whether governments have lost their ability to make decisions alone,
or to be left alone, but rather the extent to which states have retained
legal powers of decision in trade matters. To determine whether governments have the freedom to make their own judgments, or have the
power to decide, I would suggest that it is necessary to examine to what
degree states still have the freedom to "opt out" or to choose to disobey
the rules.
In other words, to what extent do the rules of international trade
still leave states free to choose to depart from the ostensibly governing
norms?
II. CIRCLING THE WAGONS: THE INCREASING CONSTRAINTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE RULES AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION

Both the substantive disciplines and the institutions built to enforce them are increasingly shrinking the outside perimeter of the play5 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr & Vorratsstelle Fur Getreide & Futtermittel, 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (1974).
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ing field within which governments are free to play the game of domestic trade regulation.
The GATT was established to deal with high tariffs, discriminatory quotas - the protectionists' tools of choice in 1930's and 1940's.
The early rounds of GATT negotiations concentrated on tariff issues, in
the belief that removing artificial tariff barriers would promote the economic principle of "comparative advantage" between industries of different countries. And they have been successful: through the 1970's,
trade grew twice as fast as production.
Perversely, as tariffs came down they were replaced with less visible, more creative means of protection, through so-called non-tariff barriers (NTB's). Through the Tokyo Round, contracting parties attempted to establish limits on such rule-making, but succeeded only in
adding a greater requirement for "transparency," in the belief that easier identification of barriers would facilitate negotiation of their reduction and ultimate removal.
And today, with growth in trade in services, and international direct and portfolio investment contributing an ever larger share of economic growth, governments have responded with more subtle and sophisticated means of regulation, often with the potential to distort the
marketplace; to wit investment restrictions, licensing and accreditation
procedures, competition policy and intellectual property protection.
It was against this backdrop that Canada sought free trade negotiations with the United States. With similar approaches to commercial
regulation, both countries rightly believed that they could achieve a
more meaningful agreement more quickly than in a multilateral
context.
The Canada-U.S. FTA6 was a watershed in international trade
regulation in several respects. First, it represented the first international
trade agreement to apply the basic GATT principles of non-discrimination to services7 and to direct investment activities. 8 Second, it added
new disciplines in such areas as temporary entry of business persons.'
And third, it made significant improvements to the GATT-based dispute settlement regime, including automatic establishment of panels"0
and strict timetables for completion of their work."
Canada and the United States took things a step further in negotiating Mexico's entry into the free trade area through NAFTA.' 2 And
6 Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and the United States of America, 1989 Can. T.S.

No. 3 [hereinafter FTA].
FTA, supra note 6, ch. 14 (Services), art. 1402, para. 1 (Rights and Obligations).
O Id. at ch. 16 (Investment), art. 1601, para. 1 (Scope and Coverage).
O

Id. at ch. 15 (Temporary Entry for Business Persons).

10 Id. at arts. 1806 (Arbitration) and 1807 (Panel Procedures).

I Id.
North American Free Trade Agreement (Between the Government of Canada, the Gov-

12

Fried-TWO PARADIGMS FOR RULE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

43

the larger international trade community followed suit. The Final Act
of the Uruguay Round 13 of multilateral trade negotiations, establishing
the World Trade Organization (WTO), is the result of seven years of
intensive negotiations. Many of the ideas reflected in the agreement

were under consideration before the NAFTA entered into force, but
will become operational only in 1995.
Both the NAFTA and the WTO incorporate the GATT's basic
14
disciplines for trade in goods, namely, disciplines on border measures

and national treatment of goods in each country.15 Both agreements
incorporate significant new disciplines on a range of NTB's, particularly regarding "technical barriers to trade"16 and "sanitary and
phytosanitary" measures.' 7 Both the framework for a WTO Procurement Code and NAFTA cover government procurement, requiring that
procurement of goods, services and construction contracts be subject to
the same rules of fair bidding and awards based on quality and price
alone.18 Negotiations on sub-national coverage are contemplated in

both fora.19 Both agreements address trade-related aspects of intellectual property (now referred to in the WTO by the acronym,
"TRIPS" 20 ). Both agreements recognize the importance of effective institutional arrangements and dispute settlement mechanisms for con-

ducting trade on a non-discriminatory basis.2 Consistent with the FTA
and NAFTA, WTO panels will now be established more quickly than
ernment of the Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America), (done in
triplicate at Ottawa, on the 11th day and the 17th day of December 1992, Mexico, D.F., on the
14th day and the 17th of December 1992, Washington, D.C., on the 8th day and the 17th day of
December 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
13 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (signed at Marrakesh, April 15 1994) (MTN.FA) [hereinafter WTO].
14 For example, NAFTA Articles 302 (Tariff Elimination) and 309 (Import and Export Restrictions), WTO Annex IA, incorporating Articles II (Schedules of Concessions) and XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) of GATT 1994.
15 NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 301 (National Treatment), WTO, supra note 13, at Annex
1A, incorporating Article III (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation) of
GATT 1994.
11 NAFTA, supra note 12, at pt. Three (Technical Barriers to Trade), WTO Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade.
17 NAFTA, supra note 12, at ch. Seven, § B (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures), WTO
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
18 NAFTA, supra note 12, at ch. 10 (Government Procurement), § B (Tendering Procedures), Agreement on Government Procurement.
19 NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 1024 (Further Negotiations), Agreement on Government
Procurement.
20 WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
2' See, for example, NAFTA, supra note 12, at chs. Nineteen (Review and Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Coutervailing Duty Matters) and Twenty (Institutional Arrangements
and Dispute Settlement Procedures), in particular, arts. 2003 (Cooperation) and 2004 (Recourse
to Dispute Settlement Procedure), WTO, supra note 13, at Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
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their GATT predecessors. 22 Their reports will be adopted as a matter

of course,2" and with the addition of a new Appellate Body, 24 their decisions are likely to be more carefully reasoned. And both agreements
recognize that the best form of dispute settlement is dispute avoidance,
and that the best way to avoid disputes is to let others know what you

are planning to do, to hear the views of others, and to correct small
mistakes before they fester and become political issues. So both agreements emphasize "transparency" - the need to pre-publish, 25 to hear
private sector views, 2a and to provide appropriate administrative and

judicial review of domestic action that might affect trade.27

There are, however, some significant differences between the two
agreements.
First, the NAFTA, based on the FTA, extrapolates the same prin-

ciples of non-discrimination that the GATT applies to goods and makes
them applicable to the provision of all services across borders, except a

few that one or another of the three countries specifically exempted.2 8

In the WTO, the GATS (the General Agreement in Trade in Services)
sets out the same principles, but applies them only to those sectors spe-

cifically offered up by member countries.29
Second, again based on the FTA, the NAFTA includes a comprehensive code of rules governing treatment of foreign investors and their

investments, including a regime of mixed, or investor-state dispute settlement.30 In the WTO, agreement was reached only on a few disci22 Compare GATT Decision of 12 April 1989 (L/6489) (Improvement to the GATT Dispute

Settlement Rules and Procedures) pt. F (Panel and Working Party Procedures) and WTO, supra
note 13, at Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 6 (Establishment of Panels).
23 WTO, supra note 13, at Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, art. 16 (Adoption of Panel Reports).
2, Id. at art. 17 (Appellate Review).
2 See NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 1802 and the more specific obligations set out in arts.
718, 909, 1411 and ch. 18; General Agreement on Trade and Services, art. III, WTO Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 7 which refers to Annex B
(Transparency of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations), WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2.9.
" See NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 1802 (2) (Publication) and the more specific obligations set out in art. 723, 913, Annexes 913.5.a-1 to 913.5a-4 and art. X of GATT 1994, incorporated in WTO Agreement.
" See NAFTA, supra note 12, at arts. 1803 (Notification and Provision of Information),
1804 (Administrative Proceedings), and the more specific obligations set out in arts. 510, 1805,
1903, 1904, 1907; WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
art. 42, WTO Agreement on Implementation of art. VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, art. 23 and art. X of GATT 1994, incorporated in WTO Agreement.
2 See reservations set out pursuant to NAFTA. NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 1206
(Reservations).
2 See WTO General Agreement in Trade in Services art. XVII (1) (Additional
Commitments).
10 NAFTA, supra note 12, at ch. Eleven (Investment), including § B (Settlement of Dis-

Fried-TWO PARADIGMS FOR RULE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

45

plines governing trade-related investment measures (TRIMS).31 While
calling for more comprehensive future negotiations, the TRIMS agreement covers only those investment regulations that have a distorting
effect on trade in goods.
Third, the FTA and NAFTA contain provisions to facilitate the
temporary entry of business persons, based on the fact that trade in
goods and services, and investment, necessarily involve people dealing
with people.3 2 WTO rules are more general, and limited only to those
services sectors in which commitments are undertaken. 33
Conversely, the WTO offers remarkable new disciplines in several
areas where Canada was not able to reach agreement on a regional
basis. In the area of subsidies and trade remedy laws, the WTO sets
out clear and comprehensive rules regarding what kinds of subsidies
are actionable,34 regarding how trade remedy proceedings are conducted,3 5 and for the first time regarding domestic programs that restrict or displace market entry or substitute for imports. 3 Until now,
only subsidies causing export injury were disciplined, through "countervailing duties." The FTA-based NAFTA "Chapter Nineteen" regime
imposes an international panel system of judicial review on domestic
decisions, but leaves each country's existing rules on subsidies and on
dumping intact.37 In agriculture, the WTO system of "tariffication"
converts a myriad of border measures and other distorting practices to
transparent tariffs, and lays the groundwork for their gradual removal.3 Textile and apparel trade will be weaned from the protections
of the Multifibre Agreement and reintegrated into the GATT/WTO
system. 39
The substantive obligations of both the NAFTA and the WTO
cover a broad range of domestic regulation - consider the sweep of
disciplines on procurement, standard-setting, visas, banking licenses,
and copyright matters all in the same document. Of course, as a general matter neither the WTO nor the NAFTA directs governments to
act in a certain way. Rather, they impose prohibitions or outside conputes between a Party and an Investor of Another Party).
31 WTO Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures.
32 FTA, supra note 6, at ch. Fifteen (Temporary Entry for Business Persons) and NAFTA,

supra note 12, at ch. Sixteen (Temporary Entry for Business Persons).
WTO General Agreement in Trade in Services (Annex on Movement of Natural Persons
Supplying Services Under the Agreement) referring to pts. III and IV.
33

34WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, pt. III (Actionable
Subsidies).

35 Id. at pt. V (Countervailing Measures).
36 Id. at art. 9 (Consultations and Authorized Remedies).
37 NAFTA, supra note 12, at arts. 1901 (3) (General Provisions) and 1902 (Retention of
Domestic Antidumping Law and Countervailing Duty Law).

3s WTO Agreement on Agriculture, art. 4 (Market Access).
39 WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.
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straints on what governments may do. However, as these international
disciplines become more precise and address more aspects of governmental activity, the authority of a trade agreement begins to impose
more significant behaviorial restraint on government conduct.
Conversely, both the WTO and NAFTA have enabled Canada
and other countries to protect sensitive activities and sectors, such as
Canada's cultural industries, social services, and policies favoring native interests, from unintended encroachment.
The dispute resolution regimes of NAFTA (Chapter Twenty for
government-to-government disputes, Chapter Nineteen Binational
Panel Review and Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Matters, and Chapter Eleven in Investor-State matters)
and the WTO provide more authoritative decision-making that should
enhance the already high rate of compliance with trade dispute settlement reports.40
In sum, an increasingly broad range of national or domestic actions affecting trade - whether legislative, executive or quasi-judicial
- are properly the subject of notification, consultation, and, if necessary, dispute settlement, according to the agreed standards and common object and purpose established in the NAFTA and WTO.
III.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNION COMPARED:

Two

PARADIGMS FOR THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

Despite these remarkable successes of the FTA, NAFTA and the
WTO, many informed observers point to the single market of the European Communities, now the European Union, as evidence that neither
the free trade agreements nor the multilateral trade regime come close
to meeting their stated objective of removing trade barriers. Many suggest that only the permanence, authority and direct applicability of
community rules, as enforced by the European Court of Justice, can
assure maintenance of a free trade regime that "works." 4 1 The question
is worthy of more detailed consideration.
The system for enforcing the rules of the NAFTA is decentralized. In large measure, NAFTA is designed to make use of, and depend on, domestic law, administrative agencies and ultimately courts
for the enforcement of the substantive obligations of the agreement.
Compliance is assured through international, increasingly judicialized,
means of control: the treaty's dispute settlement procedures provide
"I See Hudec et. al., A StatisticalProfile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1993).
41 Others allege that the World Trade Organization will seize sovereign control of domestic

regulation from member states. For a convincing response, see Sutherland, The World Trade Organization and the Future of the Multilateral Trading System, address to the St. Gallen Symposium (May 30, 1994) (GATT Press Release 1634, 30 May, 1994).
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comprehensive oversight, with the possibility of severe economic penalties (compensation or retaliation up to the value of trade harmed by the
non-conforming measure) helping to deter governments from breaching
their obligations in the first place.
Dispute settlement in the NAFTA might be best understood as
resting on four pillars.
First, and most importantly, the NAFTA provides comprehensive
procedures for government-to-government dispute settlement. Building
on the GATT and experience gained under the FTA, the NAFTA dis-

pute settlement procedures comprise three stages: consultation, 42 Commission conciliation,43 and panel proceedings." Panel proceedings
largely resemble those conducted in the GATT or pursuant to Chapter
18 of the FTA. Again, however, the NAFTA offers some significant
improvements.
Instead of separate national rosters, as was provided under the
FTA, the NAFTA calls for a consensus roster of persons acceptable to
all member countries.45 Instead of selecting nominees from the Roster
on a "labor arbitration" model, by which each government chooses
from its own national list, the NAFTA calls for a process of "reverse
selection," by which one country must select from among the other
country's nationals on the roster.46 Unlike the FTA, the NAFTA per-

mits third-country and non-member country nationals to serve as Chair
of a panel.47 Unlike the FTA, disputes regarding financial services are
42

WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 34, at art. 2006

(Consultations).
43 Id. at art. 2007 (Commission - Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation).
44 Id. at art. 2008 (Request for Arbitral Panel).
45 Id. at art. 2009 (Roster).
46 Id. at art. 2011 (1) (c) (Panel Selection).
47 Id. at art. 2011. This Article sets out a process of "reverse selection," whereby if there are
two disputing Parties, each Party ". . .shall select two panelists who are citizens of the other
disputing Party," and if there are more than two disputing Parties, the complaining Parties together "...shall select two panelists who are citizens of the Party complained against," and that
Party "...shall
select two Panelists, one of whom is a citizen of a complaining Party, and the
other of whom is a citizen of another complaining Party." The chair in either case is selected by
agreement, or failing agreement, the Party or Parties chosen by lot ". . .shall select. . .an individivual who is not a citizen of such Party or Parties." The NAFTA does not set out any citizenship requirement for roster members or for chairs who may be selected. Thus, if Canada and
Mexico wish to challenge a U.S. measure before a Panel, and the Parties are unable to agree on a
chair, assuming Canada and Mexico are chosen by lot to select the chair they may select an
American or a fourth country national, but not a Canadian or Mexican, to chair the panel, and
two Americans as panelists. The United States in this case would select one Canadian and one
Mexican. The system is designed to ensure that each country has at least one national serving on
any given panel, that complaining and complained against sides in a dispute are balanced, regardless of whether one or two countries complain (since complaints may only be in respect of "measures," there can only ever be one Party complained against), and that no side be seen to have a
guaranteed "majority" on the panel. In the hypothetical example, if fourth country nationals
could not serve as chairs, the United States would have three of the five panelists.
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fully subject to dispute settlement, through specialized procedures to
ensure appropriate panel expertise.4 8 Special rules permit the use of socalled "scientific review boards"4 9 to address factual issues related to
environmental, safety, health or conservation measures. Binding dispute
settlement is made available to determine whether one country's retaliation in response to another country's5 0 failure to comply with a panel
report is itself "manifestly excessive."
The second pillar of dispute settlement is Chapter 19, providing
for binational panel review and dispute settlement regarding antidumping and countervailing duty matters. Like the FTA, the NAFTA places
binational panels in the position of domestic courts to exercise judicial
review over domestic determinations of dumping, subsidization, and injury in AD and CVD cases.5 1 Again like the FTA, the NAFTA establishes an Extraordinary Challenge Committee for dealing with allegations in circumstances where a panel decision may have affected the
integrity of the panel review system.52 The NAFTA also carries forward the FTA procedure designed to "stabilize" trade remedy laws,
under which future amendments are presumed not to apply to free
trade partners unless specifically named; these amendments are subject
to binational panel review to determine whether they are consistent
with the objectives of the Agreement. 53 The NAFTA adds a new procedure to safeguard the panel process, designed to remedy instances in
which application of a country's domestic law undermines the functioning of the panel process.54 Finally, the NAFTA requires its members to
consult regarding possible replacement regimes. 55 A separate Working
Group on Trade and Competition is charged with reporting within five
years on all aspects of the relationship between
competition laws and
56
policies and trade in the free trade area.
The third pillar of dispute settlement is a regime of mixed, or investor-state, arbitration for the enforcement of obligations under the
investment chapter of the Agreement. These procedures are common to
Canadian Foreign Investment Protection Agreements and to U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties. Any NAFTA investor who alleges that a
host government has breached an obligation of the investment chapter
may convoke an arbitral tribunal to hear the matter.5 7 Investment obli48 Id. at art. 1414 (Dispute Settlement).
49 Id. at art. 2015 (Scientific Review Boards).
50 Id. at art. 2019, para. 3 (Non-implementation - Suspension of Benefits).

51Id. at art. 1904 (Review of Final Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations).
52 Id. at art. 1904, para. 13 (Review of Final Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations) referring to Annex 1904.13.
53 Id. at art. 1903 (Review of Statutory Amendments).
5, Id. at art. 1905 (Safeguarding the Panel Review System).
55 Id. at art. 1907, para. 2b (Consultations).
51 Id. at art. 1504 (Working Group on Trade and Competition).
57Id. at art. 1116 (Claim by an Investor of a Party on Its Own Behalf) and 1117 (Claim by
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gations include requirements for national treatment and most-favored
nation treatment, as well as certain disciplines on specified performance
requirements, rules against restricting transfers, and against expropriation without compensation. 8
Procedures may be based on ICSID or its Additional Facility, or
on the UNCITRAL Rules for such arbitrations. 9 Special and novel
procedures provide an effective means for the "consolidation" of
cases, 60 to avoid procedural harassment,6 1 and for the intervention of
the governments responsible for the Agreement, both individually
before the arbitral tribunal or collectively through the issuance of Commission interpretations of the Agreement on questions that may be
before the arbitral tribunal. 2
This regime provides an effective means for investors to remedy
breaches in a manner that avoids the risk of politicization of disputes,
such as through the infamous Section 301 actions in the United States,
and without having to get the political attention of one's own government to intercede on behalf of the claim. Awards for monetary damages are directly enforceable in the domestic courts of the NAFTA
members as if they were domestic court judgments.
The fourth and final pillar of dispute settlement is really one of
dispute avoidance. Using GATT terminology, one might call this pillar
one of "Transparency," or put even more simply, procedural due process. The NAFTA not only requires each country to implement the
obligations of the Agreement, but also to administer the rules of the
Agreement in their domestic legal systems in a "consistent, impartial
and reasonable manner. ' 63 This transparency principle pervades the
Agreement, and is reflected in several more specific obligations.
Governments are, as a general matter, obliged to make information available to traders and investors regarding any aspect of regulation covered by the Agreement.6 4 Several "Enquiry Points" provide
points of contact for the business community to find out directly from
the government concerned, for example the standards that govern his
imports, or procurement opportunities in that country. 5 Further, laws
and regulations should be published or otherwise made available in advance to allow those affected to become acquainted with the measure
an Investor of a Party on Behalf of an Enterprise).
Id. at ch. 11 (Investment), § A (Investment).
' Id. at art. 1130 (Place of Arbitration).
0 Id. at art. 1126 (Consolidation).
IId. at art. 1126, para. 2 (Consolidation).
62 Id. at art. 1131 (Governing Law in Investor-State Arbitration).
Id. at art. 1804 (Administrative Proceedings). See also Art. 510 (Review and Appeal).
Id. at art. 1802, para. I (Publication).
" Id. at art. 719 (Inquiry Points), 910 (Inquiry Points) and 1019, para. 2c (Provision of
Information).
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and to adjust their production or business plans accordingly. 6
Governments should provide at least one level of administrative
review on matters covered by the Agreement. 67 To take a simple example, an erroneous decision by a customs officer at a port of entry can be
taken to a higher level in the responsible ministry for correction. 8
The NAFTA requires each country to adopt or maintain judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals or procedures for prompt review and correction of administrative action.69
Special procedures in the three countries' domestic systems will
provide the certainty and predictability that I talked about earlier. For
example, regarding rules of origin, any exporter may obtain a binding
advance ruling on whether his product meets the test" - no longer
will a manufacturer such as Honda run the risk of planning and producing on the basis of one set of rules, only to find that the importing
country has chosen to administer them differently.
Finally, the NAFTA encourages the use of private commercial arbitration or other means of alternate dispute resolution as an effective
means for settling business disputes in the free trade area.7 1 A special
advisory committee to the Commission will be invited to make recommendations on the availability, use and effectiveness of arbitration and
other similar procedures. 2
Chapter Nineteen panels do apply the domestic law of the importing country. Scholars will continue to debate whether the role of the
panels is to apply the law as it is in fact applied, or as it should be
applied.
73
The NAFTA provisions for advance rulings in customs matters,
for bid challenge review procedures in procurement, 4 for special bilateral safeguards or "escape clause" actions, 5 and more generally for
administrative and judicial review,7 6 as well as special rules to permit
domestic courts to seek the guidance of the Commission on the inter77
pretation of Agreement in domestic cases that raise such questions,
collectively suggest that under the NAFTA domestic fora may effec8 Id. at art. 1802, para. 2 (Publication).
Id. at art. 1805 (Review and Appeal).
8 Id. at art. 510 (Review'and Appeal).
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6 See, WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 34, at art.
1805 (Review and Appeal).
70 NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 509 (Advance Rulings).
" Id. at art. 2022 (Alternative Dispute Resolution).
712Id. at art. 2022, para. 4 (Alternative Dispute Resolution).
71 See, NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 509 (Advance Rulings).
7" NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 1017 (Bid Challenge).
76 Id. at ch. 8 (Emergency Action).
7 Id. at art. 1804 (Administrative Proceedings) and 1805 (Review and Appeals).
71 Id. at art. 2020, para. 2 (Referrals of Matters from Judicial or Administrative
Proceedings).
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tively serve as agents to enforce the international rules of the
agreement.7 8
The experience of Canada and the United States under the FTA
suggests that this decentralized system for enforcing trade agreement
rules indeed "works." While both countries have vigorously asserted
their rights in various proceedings,7 9 panel reports are considered to
have been of a uniformly high quality, 80 and every report, both in respect of government-to-government disputes" and regarding judicial
review of antidumping and countervailing duty matters,8 2 has been
fully respected and implemented by the government concerned.
The dispute settlement and enforcement regime of the EU offers a
second paradigm for the rule of international trade law: that of supranational authority, with domestic, usually judicial means of oversight
and control. Under the Treaty of Rome, member states have agreed
both on the substantive rules to be applied and on "legislative" machinery, including certain decisions by majority rather than unanimity, for
the adoption and promulgation of new rules. Further, the European
Commission, with power to independently pursue enforcement of community norms, in a sense acts as guardian of the integrity of the agreed
rules. This centralized system for enforcing trade agreement rules obviously also "works."
But nor is the European paradigm perfect.8 3 ' Consider the legal
situation in the United Kingdom, a country with constitutional foundations of democratic government closest to Canada and the United
States.
78 This increasing integration of international norms into the domestic administration of the
Agreement is reflected in Section 3 of the Canadian NAFTA Implementation Act: "For greater
certainty, this Act, any provision of an Act of Parliament enacted by Part II and any other federal
law that implements a provision of the Agreement or fulfils an obligation of the Government of
Canada under the Agreement shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Agreement."
70See. e.g., Live Swine from Canada (fourth administrative review) 14 ITRD 1748, 15
ITRD 1636, 15 ITRD 2025 (ECC); Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Porkfrom Canada 12 ITRD 2119,
13 ITRD 1024, 13 ITRD 1453, 13 ITRD 1859 (ECC); Certain Softwood Lumber Productsfrom
Canada(Injury) 14 ITRD 2166 (DOC), 16 ITRD 1168, panel decision (December 17, 1993) (not
yet reported, ECC decision) (August 3, 1994) (not yet reported).
80See Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement Under Chapter 19 of the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 269 (1991).
"' In Re Article 304 and Definition of Direct Costs (June 8, 1992) 14 ITRD 2326; In Re
Canada's Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring (October 16, 1989) 12 ITRD 1026;
Lobsters from Canada (May 25, 1990) 12 ITRD 1653; Canadian Durum Wheat Sales (February
8, 1993) 15 ITRD 2270; Distribution and Sale of UHT Milk from Quebec (3 June 1993) (not yet
reported).
82 For a list providing all these cases, see Status Report, Active FTA and NAFTA Dispute
Settlement Panel Review and Status Report, Completed NAFTA and FTA Dispute Settlement
Panel Review.
" See Peter W. Schroth, Marbury and Simmenthal: Reflections on the Adoption of Decentralized Judicial Review by the Court of Justice of the European Community, 12 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 869 (1979).
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Despite its entry into the EC, Britain has not surrendered its doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. As one commentator observed:
The traditional view of the European Communities Act 1972 is that it
embodies a rule of construction. The effect of this rule is that UK
courts should interpret subsequent legislation, if at all possible, consistently with Community law and read subsequent and inadvertently
inconsistent legislation as subject to Community law. This rule preserves the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament, however, because the
European Communities Act 1972 does not state expressly that Parliament cannot repeal the European Communities Act 1972 or pass legislation deliberately contravening Community law. . .Community law
is applicable in the UK only because the European Communities Act
1972 incorporates Community law into domestic law.84
At a doctrinal level, the rules for statutory interpretation have the
same foundation as provisions of domestic law in Canada implementing
NAFTA obligations.
Although Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd. v Smith85 stated in
dictum that if Parliament deliberately passes an act with the clear intention of repudiating the Treaty or any Community provision, then
British courts must abide by the conflicting parliamentary statute, a
more recent Queen's Bench case put the question squarely before the
British courts. In the Bourgoin case,86 the plaintiffs challenged the
Minister's revocation of an import license for turkeys and issuance of a
more restrictive license that had the effect of preventing the importation of turkeys from France. The license thus had the effect of preventing the plaintiffs from trading in the UK. On application of the Commission, the European Court of Justice held that the real aim of the
revocation was to block trade rather than to prevent disease, thus constituting a breach of the free movement of goods obligations of Article
30 of the Treaty of Rome. The British government re-issued a general
license, and the plaintiffs subsequently sued the Minister for damages
for their loss of business. The court held that the right conferred by
Article 30 on private parties was the right not to be subjected to such a
measure, akin to the right in English law not to be subjected to an
ultra vires measure even though made in good faith, for which the appropriate remedy was judicial review and not damages. No action for
"breach of statutory duty" lies. Finally, the court considered that judicial review is sufficiently effective protection of the rights conferred by
Article 30 for the purposes of the Treaty of Rome. However, the court
8 Comment, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport Ex Parte Factortame Ltd. The

Limits of ParliamentarySovereignty and the Rule of Community Law, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
778 (1990-1991).
85 Macarthys Ltd. v Smith, 3 All E.R. 325 (C.A. 1979).
6" Bourgoin SA and others v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 3 All E.R. 585
(1985).
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did hold, on the basis that the government had conceded for the purpose of the preliminary issue that the Minister had revoked the license
with knowledge that it constituted a breach of British obligations under
Article 30 and would injure the plaintiffs trade, that the Minister had
on those facts committed the tort of misfeasance in public office.
Thus, for the two years it took to condemn and have corrected the
British measure through the European Court of Justice, the British
government suffered no economic consequences for its wrongful action,
on a private party's pursuit of
and ultimate costs would have depended
87
a tort claim against the government.

IV. A

FALSE DICHOTOMY?

Shortly after Congressional approval of the Canada-U.S. FTA,
House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee Chairman Sam Gibbons
urged the Adminstration to consider establishing FTA-style procedures
and institutions to address disputes between the United States and Europe. The question he could not answer, however, was "Which rules are
to apply?"
It is, arguably, the lack of consensus on substantive rules, rather
than on institutional and dispute settlement mechanisms, that may account for the seemingly widespread resistance to approaches that would
support an integrated market in the North American free trade area,"
and the seemingly widespread acceptance and support for such decisions in Europe. Many disputes in North America concern areas unregulated by international trade rules or governed by rules too general and
rudimentary in scope to provide effective discipline (such as agricultural trade), or areas where in the absence of internationally-agreed
rules one or another country (although usually the United States) has
sought to legislate, adjudicate and enforce domestically for acts abroad
that either have "effects" within the territory or affect "vital" national
interests.8 9
87 Possible exposure for liability may, however, be greater today. In Cases C-6/90 and 9/90
Francovich v. Italy, 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1993), the European Court of Justice established a right to
restitution for individuals, based on Community law, against a Member State for deficient or nonimplementation of EC directives, under narrowly defined conditions: first, the directive must grant
rights to individuals; second, the contents of the right must be identifiable on the basis of provisions of the directive; and third, there must be a causal link between the violation of the obligation
and the damage suffered by the injured persons. Such actions are to be adjudicated by national
courts, subject to guidance they receive from the European Court of Justice under the Article 177
procedure.
81 See, e.g., In Re Article 304 and Definition of Direct Costs and Canadian Durum Wheat
Sales, supra note 81.
89 Space does not permit an examination of the breadth and frequency of U.S. assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in areas where an international consensus on the underlying regulatory
principles is lacking. It is noteworthy that problems have arisen in respect of labor law (the
ARAMCO case), export controls (Canada maintains a blocking order under its Foreign Extrater-
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Accordingly, in areas unregulated or modestly regulated by inter-

national norms, a greater degree of "sovereignty" or "independence" in
decision-making remains. In these circumstances - in the absence of
international agreement on the substantive norms to be applied - disputes center instead on the propriety of unilateral enforcement. Put
more simply, the question becomes whether access to the U.S. market
is, or should be, a reward for "good" behavior, as determined by the
United States. For example, the current debate regarding MFN treat-

ment for China in light of human rights violations involves the question
of withholding non-GATT-bound preferences."0 In the area of export
controls, the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill's9 1 sanctions for export control
violations are limited to access to the U.S. defense procurement market, an area largely outside the coverage of the GATT Procurement

Code.92 And the Thai copyright and Brazilian pharmaceuticals investigations, conducted under the auspices of s. 301, each involved areas
where the "target" government had, in the exercise of its sovereign au-

thority, chosen not to sign on to certain international standards. 93
The manner in which the governments of Canada, Mexico and the
United States addressed labor and environment concerns raised in the
NAFTA context,94 and the GATT panel's consideration of similar issues in the Tuna-Dolphin case," suggest that the best way to avoid the
perils of unilateralism is to reach agreement on the substantive rules.
Conversely, where there are agreed rules, the best measure of the effec-

tiveness of international rules may well be how often member governments comply with the obligations they have undertaken. Whether the
ritorial Measures Act to respond to the U.S. Cuban Democracy Act), criminal law (the Alvarez
Machain case), taxation (the Alcan and Barclay'scases on unitary taxation), and of course, antitrust. Nor are these problems limited to the international plane. Courts and academics still actively debate conflict of law developments on minimum contacts and judicial jurisdiction - International Shoe continues to be revisited. See William A. Voxman, Jurisdiction over a Parent
Corporationin Its Subsidiary's State of Incorporation, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 327 (1992), and especially Earl M. Maltz, Visions of Fairness- The Relationship Between Jurisdictionand Choice-ofLaw, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 751 (1988).
11 See Jeffrey A. McCredie, Human Rights Concerns in the People's Republic of China: an
Appraisal of Recent Events, 3 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 217 (1989).
91 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410a as enacted by Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2444 102 Stat. 1366
(1988).
92 See Daniel J. Fitzpatrick, Note, Of Ropes, Buttons, and Four-By-Fours:Import Sanctions
for Violations of the COCOM Agreement, 29 VA. J. INTL L. 249 (1988) (discussing the so-called
Toshiba incident).
11 See Tedd L. McDorman, U.S.-Thailand Trade Disputes: Applying Section 301 To Cigarettes and Intellectual Property, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 90 (1992). See also Chris Shore, Note, The
Thai Copyright Case and Possible Limitations of ExtraterritorialJurisdictionin Actions Taken
Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 725 (Spring 1992).
"' See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 1994 Can. T.S. No. 3
and North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 1994 Can. T.S. No. 4.
11 Restriction on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, August 16, 1991. GATT Doc. DS21/
R, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991).
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decentralized or supranational paradigm for enforcing compliance with
the agreed rules is the better system is beside the point.
So what are the common elements that lead to a reasonably good
track record of compliance both in the FTA/NAFTA and European
systems? I would suggest that there are two essential elements.
First, member governments must have an appreciation of and a
commitment to the substantive rules that they have previously accepted, regardless of whether they are implemented by way of incorporation into domestic law or by way of asking supranational institutions
to directly enforce, or in the case of Europe even to promulgate, on
their behalf. This perspective suggests that the differences between the
European and FTA/NAFTA enforcement systems are ones of form
rather than of substance. 6 Member states in both systems have equally
firm commitments to the principles of non-discrimination and national
treatment. The two regimes arguably reflect only a choice of different
means for the enforcement of these principles: one, by the inter-mediation of domestic law, and the other by direct application of Community
law.
But even this distinction of form is becoming blurred. For example, under NAFTA the three governments promulgated a lengthy document to further elaborate the agreement's rules of origin, called The
Uniform Regulationsfor the Administration of Customs Rules.97 This
trilaterally negotiated and agreed document was subsequently adopted
verbatim by each country as a domestic regulation.98 The rulemaking
in this instance had its origins in a trilateral context. The Uniform
Regulations were drafted by an international team of bureaucrats,
comprising Mexican, Canadian and American representatives. They
were adopted by each country through the vehicle of domestic regulation. The means chosen to implement the rules reflect no less a commitment to accept international rules and disciplines than a member state
of the European Union adopting domestic measures to implement a
Commission decision or directive.
Second, compliance is furthered to the extent that the system pro'e This is not to belittle to the fundamental distinction, described in Section I of this paper,
between systems in which a government maintains its own right of decision and those where a
government has accepted the legitimacy of another entity legislating on its behalf, even where that
government votes against such action, as occurs under the majority voting rules applicable to the

Council of Ministers and pursuant to authority granted to the European Parliament in the European Union.
97 Uniform Regulations for the Interpretation, Application and Administration of Chapter
Four (Rules of Origin), C. Gaz., pt. I, vol. 128, no.3, c.4 (January 15 1994) p. 3 0 1 and Uniform
Regulations for the Interpretation,Application, and Administration of Chapters Three (National
Treatment and Market Access for Goods) and Five (Customs Procedures)of the North American
Free Trade Agreement. C. Gaz., Part I, vol. 128, no. 3, c.3 and c.5 (January 15 1994) p.4 7 7 .
98 Canada's domestic Regulation is NAFTA Rules of Origin Regulations, C. Gaz., pt. II,
vol. 128 no.1 (January 12 1994) p.60.
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vides some means of enforcement that permits the imposition of economic costs sufficient to have a deterrent effect. In the FTA/NAFTA
context, the GATT-based system of requiring compensation to be of-

fered, failing which the country complained against may face retaliation, has been adequate to ensure that every one of the government-togovernment panel reports issued to date has been respected. In Europe,
the penalty procedure created under the Treaty of Maastricht suggests
that member states share the view that economic leverage is an impor-

tant compliance tool. 99
So, are countries of the European Community or Union less free to
decide to opt out, less free to exercise their own judgment than are the

parties to NAFTA? In legal terms, obviously so. Even the British
courts accepted that the Minister's subsequent inconsistent regulation

could not be effective when faced with a prior Community rule. But in
terms of actual compliance, and adherence to the international disci-

plines involved, the record under the FTA/NAFTA regime reflects the
fact that decentralized institutions and means of implementation, and

less international bureaucracy, can be just as effective as supranational
authority in constraining government action within the bounds established by agreed trade disciplines.

9 The Treaty of Maastricht amends Article 171 of the Treaty of Rome to provide for the

possibility of the European Court of Justice imposing a lump sum or penalty payment for noncompliance with a judgment in which it ruled that a Member State had failed to fulfil an obligation under EC law. Such a judgment would result either due to action by the Commission against
a Member State or by one Member State against another Member State. The former action is
common; the latter is very rare. The initiative to request the Court to impose a penalty lies with
the Commission, which is required to first put the Member State on notice through a "reasoned
opinion" that must include a deadline for compliance with the original judgment and specify the
lump sum or penalty the Commission considers appropriate in the circumstances.

